Abstract: 'Thought insertion' in schizophrenia involves somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. Some philosophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare thought insertion to certain experiences of 'verbal hallucination' and show that they amount to different descriptions of the same phenomenon: a quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. We add that the agency/ownership distinction is unhelpful here. What requires explanation is not why a person experiences a type of intentional state without the usual sense of agency, but why she experiences herself as the agent of one type of intentional state rather than another. We conclude by sketching an account of how this might happen.
Introduction
First-person reports of 'thought insertion' in schizophrenia (hereafter TI) suggest that it is possible to experience one's own thoughts as emanating from someone else. On one interpretation, TI involves an error of identification: you recognise the thought but fail to recognise it as your own. If this is right, it overturns the assumption that you can be "wrong about which psychological state you are in" but not about "whose psychological state it is" (Campbell, 1999, p.609) . In phenomenological terms, it challenges the view that, if you experience psychological state x, then you experience x as yours. A comprehensive explanation of TI needs to include an account of (a) what a TI experience consists of and (b) how TI is generated, where (a) is concerned solely with clarifying the relevant phenomenology, while (b) also addresses nonconscious or 'subpersonal' mechanisms. In this paper, we focus upon (a), but there are also implications for (b). Suppose TI is taken to be an experience of type x when it is in fact an experience of type y, and that an account is then offered of x-generating mechanisms, where x-generating mechanisms are not involved in generating y. Such the 'act of thinking' interpretation of TI is adopted, VH turn out to be very different from TI: VH involves experiencing p in the absence of p, while TI involves thinking that p but experiencing one's thinking as someone else's. In one case, there is an anomalous experiential content. In the other, one's own intentionality is misattributed to someone else. So, while VH involves a familiar kind of experience (albeit a nonveridical one), TI involves an experience that is intrinsically anomalous and strangea thought process that one does not think. Given this difference, it is puzzling that many authors attempt to account for them both in the same way, often by appealing to the agency/ownership distinction (e.g. Stephens and Graham, 2000; Gallagher, 2005) .
The content view has the virtue of dissolving this tension. It is sometimes suggested that VH and TI are actually different descriptions of the same phenomenon (e.g. Langland-Hassan, 2008, p.373) . The content view makes clear how this could be so.
If TI involves experiencing thought contents as (a) present, and (b) emanating from elsewhere, then it shares these characteristics with perceptual experiences. Hence it might equally be described in terms of a perception with an unfamiliar content.
Conversely, if VH content is not perceived to originate in a localised external source and does not have the full range of auditory characteristics, it could equally be described in terms of experiencing an alien thought.
So far, this is rather speculative. We have argued that (a) TI could involve thought content rather than episodes of thinking; (b) this would bring it closer to various familiar phenomena and thus make it easier to understand; and (c) the content view also accommodates the alleged similarity or even identity between VH and TI. But is there any evidence for the view? In order to address that question, we first need to constrain the scope of our enquiry to certain kinds of VH. VHs are heterogeneous; variables include number of voices, degree of personification, the content of what is said, mode of address (second-or third-person) and presence or absence of auditory qualities (Nayani and David, 1996; Larøi, 2006 , McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014 .
Sometimes, VHs are said to be auditory and external. For example, Leudar et al. (1997, p.888 ) describe them as "verbal and with phenomenal properties like hearing another person speaking, but in the absence of anyone who could have produced it"; Garrett and Silva (2003, p.445) similarly state that "the subjective quality of sensation is a near-universal feature of auditory hallucinations"; and Wu (2012, p.90) premises his model on the fact that VHs "sound like voices". However, others describe them as predominantly internal and lacking in auditory properties. Stephens and Graham (2000) argue at length that most 'voice-hearers' do not actually hear voices at all; Frith (1992, p.73) maintains that a VH can involve something more abstract than hearing a voice, "an experience of receiving a communication without any sensory component"; and Moritz and Larøi (2008. p.104) suggest that the term 'voice-hearing' may well be a "misnomer", an "inaccurate term to express that their cognitions are not their own".
In fact, it seems clear that VHs come in both guises. David (1994) states that most but not all subjects experience voices as arising "inside the head", while Nayani and David (1996) report that 49% of their subjects heard voices through their ears, 38% internally and 12% in both ways. Leudar et al. (1997, p.889) state that 71% of their subjects heard only internal voices, 18% heard voices "through their ears", and 11% heard both. Some or all external VHs might well have properties much like those of veridical auditory perceptions, but internal VHs do not. Although they are not always described as wholly bereft of auditory properties, first-person accounts suggest that they are quite different from those VHs that are experienced as audition-like and as originating in externally located events. This is readily apparent when we scrutinise the testimonies of individuals who experience both kinds, where the two are explicitly Neither 'internal' nor 'external' VHs are exclusive to schizophrenia diagnoses. The above quotations (and all other numbered quotations in this paper) were obtained via a questionnaire study on 'voices and voice-like experiences', and respondents listed several different diagnoses. So, while we aim to say something about the nature of TI and VH experiences, we remain noncommittal about (a) the reliability of diagnostic categories such as 'schizophrenia' and (b) whether certain kinds of experience are specific to certain diagnostic categories. postulating an unfamiliar kind of experience that falls somewhere in between thinking and perceiving. Hence, in the absence of conflicting evidence in support of the thought process view, the content view is to be preferred.
It is plausible to suggest that some internal VHs do have auditory or audition-like properties, and thus further lend themselves to description in terms of 'hearing voices'. However, this need not conflict with our claim that they are TI under another description. The view that thought is sometimes or always wholly bereft of auditory properties is far from uncontroversial. 7 Most approaches to VHs take them to involve misattributed 'inner speech' rather than simply 'thought', where inner speech is only one form that our thoughts can take. And Hoffman (1986) , amongst others, maintains that inner speech incorporates "auditory imagery". We should add that, in suggesting that internal VHs resemble perceptions, we do not wish to imply an exclusive resemblance to sensory perceptions of the external environment. They are same processes were involved in its production. But TI/VH would not, assuming it involved processes associated with thinking rather than perceiving. If it involved a combination of the two, there might be no fact of the matter. Another option is to adopt a wholly phenomenological conception of perception and thought: if one is in a phenomenological state that is like believing or perceiving, then one is ipso facto in a state of that kind (e.g. Horgan and Tienson, 2002) . 8 Hence TI/VH would not involve mistaken identity but a blurring of the distinction between thinking and perceiving, a type of intentionality that is neither one nor the other.
For current purposes, we do not wish to insist on any particular definition of perception. Our claim is that, whether or not 'perceiving or thinking that p' is to be identified with 'experiencing oneself as perceiving or thinking that p', what we have in the case of TI/VH is 'an experience of being in a certain kind of intentional state', which differs in character from mundane experiences of thinking that p or perceiving that p. 9 Hence, regardless of how perception is defined, it is clear that TI/VH departs from the orthodox conception of hallucination. In phenomenological terms, orthodox hallucination involves a perceptual experience of p (or an experience that closely resembles one of perception in a given sensory modality), but in the absence of p.
Although certain VH experiences may take this form, those that are also describable in TI terms involve an intrinsically strange, quasi-perceptual experience of something that otherwise resembles thought content.
One might also wonder how our account relates to the widespread view that TI is a 'delusion'. It cannot simply be the case that VH is a 'hallucination' and TI a 'delusion', given that they can amount to different descriptions of a common phenomenon. The 'voice hearer' may or may not take her experience of VH/TI to be veridical. It feels as if the content comes from elsewhere, and whether or not this either constitutes or gives rise to a delusion depends on whether or not the subject 8 As Horgan and Tienson (2002, pp.522-523) Garrett and Silva (2003, p.453 ) also suggest that VHs involve "a new category of experience that blends elements of perception and thought but remains distinct from both". However, they emphasise the sensory qualities of VHs in a way that we do not.
accepts that it comes from elsewhere. It is debatable whether a sense of the content's coming from a personal source is intrinsic to the experience or whether it involves the embellishment of a core experience. However, the latter is plausible, given that VHs are personified to varying degrees (Bell, 2013) . And, as noted by Hoerl (2001, p.189) , patients "seem much more unequivocal that the thoughts in question do not belong to them than they are about possible ways in which others might be implicated in their occurrence". A high degree of personification may also be linked to delusionformation, insofar as it involves an increasingly elaborate attempt to make sense of the experience in terms of another agent, who may have specific characteristics and intentions. In addition, it is likely that the description 'TI' lends itself to a delusional interpretation more so than that of 'hearing a voice'. Saying that one 'hears a voice' serves to express an anomalous experience but does not operate as an explanation of it (unless one further insists that the experience is a veridical one). However, TI includes more specific reference to causes. Hence it is less likely to be used as a noncommittal description of an experience, and also more likely to operate as an explanation: I have the anomalous experience because B is inserting thoughts in my head. That said, the same delusion could equally be construed in terms of other people 'really speaking in my head', and a TI description does not imply endorsement of a TI explanation. So the distinction between an internal VH and a 'delusion of TI' is not a clear one, and the underlying experience can be the same in both cases.
Agency and Ownership Revisited
Given the account we have sketched, we do not find the agency/ownership distinction helpful in this context. That distinction could be applied to an intentional state, its content, or both: I am the agent and/or owner of intentional state x and/or its content p. In one sense, experienced ownership of an intentional state implies ownership of its content. In short, if I experience myself as perceiving, then I experience myself as having a perception of something. And, if I experience myself as thinking, I
experience myself as having a thought with some content. Even in the case of TI, one takes oneself to be having an experience with some content. What is anomalous is not that the content 'fails to belong to me' but that it is experienced as non-self-generated, when contents of that kind usually are self-generated. However, there is another sense in which one does not experience oneself as the 'owner' of p. As Bortolotti and Broome (2009, p.208) Perception is not a wholly passive process. We actively look, we listen, we interact with our surroundings, and we physically manipulate objects in order to reveal their hidden features. As various enactivist approaches to perception have emphasised, perception is a matter of exploratory activity rather than the passive receipt of information (e.g. Noë, 2004) . And one need not endorse one or another enactivist position in order to accept the less committal view that perceptual experience involves varying degree of agency, rather than passive receipt of sensory information. It should of course be added that we do not experience ourselves as wholly responsible for the contents of our perceptions. Whatever theory of perception one might adopt, it seems 10 See also Sousa and Swiney (2013, p.644) for a 'deflationary' account of 'ownership' along these same lines. Talk of 'ownership', they note, can have all sorts of different connotations. In the context of TI, it is just another way of saying that one is not the agent of the thought. "The patient is simply emphasizing via the language of thought ownership that she does not have the sense of being the producer ('source') of the thoughts". See Gallagher (in press) for a response to several criticisms of the agency/ownership distinction and for further clarification of his own view. His various responses and refinements do not -so far as we can see -pose a challenge to our own concerns about the agency/ownership distinction as applied to TI, although they do amount to a plausible case for its more general applicability.
fair to say that we experience the contents of our perceptions as largely determined by things that are external to ourselves. So perceptual experience might involve some sense of agency, but we don't attribute our perceptual contents to our own agency. When one experiences oneself as the agent of mental state type x, the content of x is experienced as self-produced.
When one experiences oneself as the agent of mental state y, the content of y is experienced as non-self-produced.
Why, then, is the content of thought ordinarily experienced as self-produced while the content of perception is not? The answer might seem simple enough: non-selfproduced contents have certain properties that distinguish them from self-produced contents. For example, a voice that emanates from somewhere else has a perceived location and various distinctively auditory characteristics. But one of the most interesting things about TI/VH is that it challenges such a view. The phenomenological difference between thinking that p and perceiving that p cannot be wholly attributed to different contents, given that TI involves something that retains the properties of thought content but at the same time seems to come from elsewhere.
So what we need to account for is this:
One experiences a content of the kind ordinarily associated with a state of type x, but in such a way that it is experienced as non-self-produced. In virtue of the content's seeming to be non-self-produced, the experience resembles a state of type y, even though its content differs from those ordinarily associated with y.
We will now sketch a tentative account of how such an experience might arise, an account that does not appeal to the sense of agency.
Reformulating the Question
We have suggested that the question to ask is not 'why is there a sense of ownership but no sense of agency for an intentional state of a given type?' but, rather, 'why is there an erosion of the phenomenological distinction between two intentional state types?' As already noted, we doubt that appeals to conscious agency will assist in distinguishing quasi-perceptual experiences of thought content from seemingly passive but quite unproblematic 'episodes' of thought. But one could instead appeal to a breakdown of non-conscious processes. Even when a thought seems to come unannounced, that thought (and -to some degree -its content) might still be anticipated in a non-conscious way. It is when such anticipatory processes breaks down that the thought is experienced in an anomalous way.
That said, we should not be too hasty in ruling out a role for conscious anticipation.
Even if we do not experience a sense of effort, agency, or intention in relation to all thought contents, perhaps they are at least anticipated. So it could be that the phenomenological difference between TI and thinking is that the content of TI arises without any conscious anticipation and is therefore more like perceptual content.
However, there are two problems with that view. First of all, perceptual contents are not always unanticipated. Indeed, it has been argued that perceptual experience is riddled with anticipation, as exemplified by moments of surprise when things do not appear as anticipated but where anticipation did not involve consciously entertaining a propositional attitude with the content 'x is behind the door' or 'y has property p and not property q' (Husserl, 1948 (Husserl, /1973 Noë, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008 Ratcliffe, , 2015 Madary, 2013) . Furthermore, what we perceive is often partly attributable to our own activities, which we expect to have certain, often quite specific effects. If I hurl a glass at a wall, it comes as no surprise to me when it makes a loud crash and shatters into pieces. The second problem is that many 'voice hearers' do anticipate when they will 'hear' a voice and they also anticipate, to varying degrees, what they will 'hear'.
Some report being able to communicate with their 'voices' (e.g. Garrett and Silva, 2003, p.449) , and 38% of the subjects who participated in a study by Nayani and David (1996, p.183) reported being able to initiate a voice. This also poses problems for the view that VH/TI is to be accounted for in terms of non-conscious prediction mechanisms. It could well be that some such mechanism fails. Even so, where there is conscious anticipation, some kind of non-conscious prediction mechanism is surely at work too.
Another consideration to keep in mind is the content-specificity of many TI/VH experiences. Where a non-conscious mechanism breaks down, it might do so only sporadically, but this does not account for the fact that many TI/VH experiences have consistent thematic contents. More often than not, the contents of 'voices' are insults and simple terms of abuse, an observation that applies to several different psychiatric diagnoses and also to some of the VH experiences reported in non-clinical populations (Nayani and David, 1996; Leudar et al. 1997; Aleman and Larøi, 2008) .
Given this, it is unsurprising that VHs are often associated with heightened anxiety (Allen et al., 2005; Kuipers et al., 2006; Paulik, Badcock and Maybery, 2006) . What is of particular interest to us, though, is the observation that generalised social anxiety often precedes the onset of VHs and that anxiety may be especially pronounced immediately before the onset of a voice. It has therefore been suggested that anxiety acts as a trigger (Freeman and Garety, 2003, p.923 ).
We will now briefly sketch an account of how anxiety might generate the kind of experience described here. (A more detailed account is offered in Ratcliffe and
Wilkinson, forthcoming). We do not wish to insist that this account applies to every case of TI/VH; such experiences could well arise in a number of different ways.
Rather, our claim is that on the basis of (a) our account of VH/TI, and (b) available empirical evidence, there is a plausible hypothesis that applies to at least a subset of cases. Our proposal is that VH/TI is not a matter of lacking anticipation, conscious or otherwise, but of anticipating the arrival of thought contents in a distinctive way. It is about how one anticipates. Anxiety, we suggest, alienates a person from the object of anxiety: when one is anxious about p, one experiences p as something that impedes one's agency -something that one may seek to avoid but feel helpless in the face of.
By implication, p is experienced as distinct from oneself. It need not be experienced as physically external. Serious illness can involve losing an implicit 'trust' in the body's ability to perform its various functions and, along with this, a curious sense of estrangement from one's body (Carel, 2013) . With this, bodily experiences may themselves be objects of anxiety; they are experienced as impinging upon the self, threatening the self. We can also feel anxious about our own abilities to perform various tasks. However, we are seldom anxious about our own thought contents.
When we are anxious about the prospect of messing up something important, we are anxious about a state of affairs that may or may not arise, not about 'the thought that a state of affairs might arise'.
But suppose that you became anxious about the arrival of thoughts with contents such as 'you are a worthless piece of filth and everyone is laughing at you'. It might be objected that you cannot feel anxious about a thought with the content p before you have that thought; the thought must have formed already. However, thought contents do not always form instantaneously. Often, there is a short period during which they coalesce and their content becomes more determinate. Take the experience of realising that you have forgotten something important. It can start with an inchoate sense of anxiety which might be expressed by the indeterminate content 'something is wrong', followed by 'I've forgotten something' and, finally, 'I've not brought my passport to the airport', after which the repercussions of this omission increasingly sink in.
That thoughts take shape in some such way is also consistent with the commonplace assumption that VHs involves misidentified 'inner speech', as distinct from thought more generally, where inner speech is a form that only some thoughts take on. As
Stephens and Graham (2000, p.82) remark, talking to oneself is one "way of thinking". This suggests a process whereby thought contents become inner speech contents (Hoffman, 1986; Fernyhough, 2004 If something along these lines is right, then the difference between TI and more mundane experiences of thinking is not that TI involves a lack of something (for example, a sense of agency). Rather, a certain affectively charged way of anticipating is present in TI. Hence it may not be that some positive characteristic is required in order to identify thought content as self-generated. Perhaps it does not require any anticipation at all, conscious or otherwise. Many thoughts could well be just what they seem to be, unanticipated and quite mundane -the song that starts in one's head, the irrelevant thought that disrupts one's concentration while writing. Self-attribution could be the default way of experiencing thought contents. It takes an anomalous mode of anticipation, such as anxious anticipation, to transform an episode of thought into a quasi-perceptual encounter with something.
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What we are proposing is, in one respect, consistent with accounts that appeal to lack of endorsement; a thought appears alien when -for whatever reason -one fails to endorse its content (Stephens and Graham, 2000; Bortolotti and Broome, 2009 VHs with less pronounced auditory phenomenology may be more often associated with schizophrenia diagnoses, thus accounting for more frequent reports of TI in schizophrenia.
14 Conclusion 14 As noted earlier, other 'subtypes' of VH are not captured by our account, including many that more closely resemble veridical auditory experiences in character. However, certain kinds of 'external VH' can also be understood in terms of social anxiety, thus accounting for why internal and external VHs often occur together. Dodgson and Gordon (2009, p.326) observe that anxiety and hyper-vigilance generate false positives, especially in 'noisy' environments where stimuli are susceptible to multiple interpretations. This, they suggest, accounts for a "substantial subset of externally located voices". This is also consistent with the "neural diathesis -stress" model of schizophrenia (Walker and Diforio, 1997) , especially a more recent version of it that places the emphasis on responses to situations involving an "uncontrollable, social-evaluative threat" Fernyhough, 2007, p.1174) . If something along these lines is right, the phenomenology and underlying mechanisms in the internal and external cases would be quite different, but they could be attributable to a common underlying causepronounced and pervasive social anxiety.
It might seem that we have offered a rather deflationary view of TI. One does not experience an episode of thinking while failing to identify oneself as the agent.
Rather, one experiences p as the content of an unfamiliar type of intentional state.
Although still puzzling, this is closer to more familiar experiences where we take ourselves to be in state x in relation to p when we are actually in state y. However, what we in fact end up with is a version of the view that TI involves an erosion of ego boundaries, an experienced blurring of the distinction between self and non-self (see e.g. Hoerl, 2001 , for a discussion of that view). It is not that one fails to distinguish self from non-self by experiencing a state of type x while failing to self-attribute it.
Rather, one lacks an ability to distinguish type x from type y, where the distinction between them is partly constitutive of the self / non-self distinction.
Suppose one were completely unable to distinguish perceiving that p from entertaining the thought that p or remembering that p, and that this applied to all cases of p. One would lack any sense of the distinction between one's own consciousness and things external to it. More specifically, if the distinction between thinking that p and receiving the communication that p from someone else were lacking, one would not be able to distinguish one's own thought contents from those of others. The 'I think' would be gone from experience. Now, TI does not involve anything quite so extreme. Even so, to have frequent experiences that do not respect the phenomenological distinctions between types of intentional state (distinctions that the self/other/world distinction depends upon for its intelligibility) would challenge -to varying degrees -the sense of being a singular subject of experience, distinct from the surrounding world and from other subjects. This would be exacerbated by a less extreme but more pervasive erosion of the experienced distinctions between intentional state types. Consider the following first-person account, by someone with a schizophrenia diagnosis:
…the real 'me' is not here any more. I am disconnected, disintegrated, diminished.
Everything I experience is through a dense fog, created by my own mind, yet it also resides outside my mind. I feel that my real self has left me, seeping through the fog toward a separate reality, which engulfs and dissolves this self. (Kean, 2009 (Kean, , p.1034 15 15 Sass (e.g. 1992 Sass (e.g. , 1994 describes such experiences in great detail, in a way that is consistent with much of what we have proposed.
Talk of disintegration and diminishment, and of things being experienced as selfcreated and at the same time 'outside', can be plausibly interpreted in terms of the erosion of phenomenological differences between familiar intentional state categories.
Without those distinctions, one is no longer a 'real self', situated in a world that is not of one's own making. The sense of being a coherent locus of experience and agency, distinct from what it experiences, is thus compromised and the self is 'diminished'.
Hence TI does, after all, point to a profound disturbance of first-person experience.
